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1.   Introduction 
 
The relationship between the EU legal order and the international 
one has been the focus of attention in recent years. Whilst triggered by 
the ‘insurrectionist’ attitude of the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion (CJEU) in the Kadi saga,1 the study of the relationship between EU 
law and the international legal order has covered a plurality of perspec-
tives and approaches.2 Without entering into such discussions here, it 
could be nonetheless concluded that such a relationship is based on the 
duty to respect international law and the principle of consistent inter-
pretation3 and that the application of these two obligations is condi-
tioned by sector-specific nuances and, ultimately, by the constitutional 
foundations of EU law.4  
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Twente. 
1 Cases T-315/01, Kadi and T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat, judgments of the 
European Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the 
European Union, Commission of the European Communities, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, [2008] ECR I-6351, Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission 
[2010] ECR II-05177, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, 
Commission, Council and United Kingdom v Kadi (Kadi II), Judgment 18 July 2013. 
2 See, for example, E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti and RA Wessel (eds), International 
Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 416 and S Blockmans and 
RA Wessel, Between Autonomy and Dependence. The EU Legal Order Under the 
Influence of International Organizations (Springer-T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 304. 
3 Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019 para 9. 
4 This appears to be the significance of the 2008 Kadi judgement (n 1). See RA 
Wessel, ‘Reconsidering the relationship between international and EU Law: towards a 
content-based approach?’ in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti and RA Wessel (n 2) 7-33. See 
also S Blockmans and RA Wessel, ‘The Influence of International organisations on the 
QIL, Zoom-in 12 (2015), 3-20                                                                                                
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The present contribution takes its cue from the decision of the 
CJEU in the Diakité case.5 In Diakité, the CJEU was asked to provide 
guidance to a national court on the interrelations between a provision of 
the Qualification Directive6 and the notion of ‘internal armed conflict’ 
stemming from international humanitarian law. The purpose of the re-
quest for a preliminary ruling was to assess whether Mr Diakité was en-
titled to benefit from subsidiary protection, a form of complementary 
protection that is granted under EU law to third country nationals who 
do not qualify as refugees.7 
With its decision on the Diakité case, the CJEU seemingly delivered 
another judgment in which it disconnected the EU legal order from the 
international one, when it held that the definition of armed conflict 
provided in international humanitarian law is not designed to identify 
the situations in which international protection ex Articles 2(e) and 15 
of the Qualification Directive are applicable.8 This contribution will as-
sess the extent to which the decision of the CJEU can be interpreted as 
another example of the parochial attitude the CJEU has displayed when 
called upon to apply notions or rules stemming from international law 
for the purpose of clarifying the scope of an internal (EU) provision. 
EU and its legal order: between autonomy and dependence’ in S Blockmans and RA 
Wessel (n 2) 297-312. For a critical analysis of the impact that the Kadi decision of 2008 
had see G de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order 
after Kadi’ (2010) 51 Harvard Intl L J 1. For an analysis of the relationship between the 
EU legal order and the international one in relation to the development of the Common 
European Asylum System see V Moreno-Lax, ‘Of Autonomy, Autarky, Purposiveness 
and fragmentation: The relationship between EU Asylum law and International 
Humanitarian Law’ in D J Cantor and J-F Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? War 
Refugees and International Humanitarian Law (Brill 2014) 295-344. 
5 Case C-285/12 Aboubacar Diakité v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux 
apatrides, Judgment 30 January 2014. 
6 Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted, OJ L304/12 30 September 2004. That Directive has now been repealed by 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ 20 
December 2011 L337/9. In this contribution references to the Qualification Directive 
regard the 2004 Directive. 
7 Art 2 (f) of the Qualification Directive (n 6). 
8 Diakité (n 5) para 23. 
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This contribution will offer a short overview of the positions that IHL 
and international refugee law have within the EU legal system (section 
2), before turning to the analysis of the Diakité affair in which the CJEU 
found itself at the crossroad between IHL and international refugee law 
for the purpose of applying the Qualification Directive (section 3). Sec-
tion 4 will then look into the institutional and substantive consequences 
of the CJEU decision in Diakité and with some conclusions being 
drawn in section 5. 
 
 
2.  IHL and the Geneva Convention on the status of Refugees in the EU 
legal order 
 
The Geneva Convention of 1951 relating to the status of refugees 
holds a special position within the EU legal system. By adopting a tech-
nique similar to that used in the Maastricht Treaty in relation to the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, Article 78 TFEU is a provision 
of EU primary law authorising the influence of an external source. 
More precisely, Article 78 TFEU affirms that for the purpose of devel-
oping a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection to third country nationals the European Union is bound to 
abide by the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 
January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant trea-
ties.9 This provision makes clear that any legislative instrument or inter-
national agreement concluded by the EU must be in accordance with 
the Geneva Convention and the latter thus emerges as a benchmark of 
legality, or a normative parameter, that can be invoked to challenge the 
legitimacy of EU secondary norms under Articles 263 and 267 (b) 
TFEU. Secondly, the Geneva Convention of 1951 is used as the source 
of a substantive individual right under Article 18 of the EU Charter of 
9 Art 78 (1) TFEU: The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, 
subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate 
status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring 
compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance 
with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.  
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Fundamental Rights (EUCFR).10 Indeed, Article 18 EUCFR introduces 
the right to asylum within the EU legal order; however, this innovation 
must be read in conjunction with, and limited by, the scope of Article 
78 TFEU and the existing legislative acquis in the field, with the result 
that the right contained in Article 18 cannot be interpreted as an abso-
lute right independent from secondary legislative acts.11  Yet, it must al-
so be emphasised that Article 18 EUCFR goes beyond the equation be-
tween ‘the right to asylum’ and the status of refugee under the Geneva 
Convention of 1951 since it affirms that the said right ‘shall be guaran-
teed with due respect for’ the Geneva Convention. This means that the 
right to asylum ex Article 18 includes a plurality of protection mecha-
nisms (national or international) in which the status of refugee is but 
one example.12  
In addition to Article 78 TFEU and Article 18 EUCFR, secondary 
instruments also systematically refer to the Geneva Convention of 1951 
either as a normative source or as a source of interpretation. This is re-
flected, for example, in the preamble of the Qualification Directive of 
2004 and in its recast of 201113 and, more specifically, in a number of 
provisions of the 2004 and 2011 Directives.14 As a consequence, the 
special status of the Geneva Convention of 1951 is also reflected in the 
case law of the CJEU,15 but the Court often refers to the Convention in 
rather general terms and does not renounce the autonomous develop-
10 Art 18 EUCFR: The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the 
rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
11 See M den Heijer, ‘Article 18’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing 2014) 519-541. 
12 ibid 533. 
13 Paragraphs (2) and (3) of the two instruments are identical and affirm: (2) The 
European Council at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999 agreed 
to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full 
and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 
28 July 1951 (Geneva Convention), as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 
January 1967 (Protocol), thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring 
that nobody is sent back to persecution. (3) The Geneva Convention and Protocol 
provide the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. 
14 See, for example, art 12 (1) (a) and art 20 (6) of the 2004 Directive. 
15 See, for example, Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08 
Aydin Salahadin Abdulla and Others v Germany [2010] ECR I-01493 para 53. 
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ment of the interpretation of the EU asylum instruments, thus preserv-
ing its ‘hermeneutic monopoly’.16 At the same time, it must be borne in 
mind that the CJEU operates in a fragmented system since the Geneva 
Convention ‘contains no centralized judicial or other enforcement 
mechanisms, with the exception of the potential interpretative role of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the supervisory role of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR)’.17 There-
fore, the combination of the express references to the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1951 in the Treaties and in secondary provisions on the one 
hand, and the lack of a centralised system of enforcement and interpre-
tation of the Geneva Convention on the other, characterize the special 
relationship that the Geneva Convention of 1951 has within the EU le-
gal system and make the CJEU, at least potentially, a catalyst for uni-
form interpretation of asylum law in Europe.  Yet, the recent decision 
of the CJEU in Qurbani casts some doubt on the implications arising 
from the express references to the Geneva Convention of 1951 in the 
Treaties, since the Court argued, albeit in a slightly tautological man-
ner,18 that the combined reading of Article 78 TFEU and 18 EUCFR 
does not unequivocally confer on the CJEU the jurisdiction to interpret 
any provision of the 1951 convention.19 
Inversely, the position of IHL within the EU legal order is not ex-
pressly qualified or defined by the Treaties or the EUCFR; yet, the Eu-
16 GF Mancini, ‘The free movement of workers in the case law of the European 
Court of Justice’ in D Curtin, TF O’Higgins, D O’Keeffe (eds), Constitutional 
Adjudication in European Community and national law (Butterworths 1992) 67. 
17 G de Baere, ‘The Court of Justice of the EU as a European and International 
Asylum Court’, Working Paper 118/2013, Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies <https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp1
11-120/wp118-de-baere.pdf>. See also E Tsourdi, ‘What Role for the Court of Justice 
of the EU in the Development of a European Asylum Policy? The Case of Loss and 
Denial of International Protection’ in (2013) Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen 
en Publiekrecht  212-228. 
18 Case C-481/13 Mohammad Ferooz Qurbani, Judgment 17 July 2014, paras 24-25. 
19 ibid. The decision, however, could be interpreted in the sense that the exclusion 
of jurisdiction only exists inasmuch as a given provision of the Geneva Convention of 
1951 is not expressly mentioned in the relevant piece of EU secondary legislation (para 
28); it remains to be seen the extent to which this decision will be consolidated in the 
future. For an analysis of the Qurbani decision see, Y Holiday, ‘Penalising Refugees: 
when should the CJEU have jurisdiction to interpret Article 31 of the Refugee 
Convention?’, EU Law Analysis, <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/ 
2014/07/penalising-refugees-when-should-cjeu.html>. 
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ropean Union as a polity first and qua legal system second, is increasing-
ly intertwined with the rules stemming from the corpus iuris of the Ge-
neva system.20 Indeed, the EU proactively contributes to the promotion 
of international humanitarian law (IHL) in a number of ways. First, the 
EU endorses and promotes the application of IHL with its partners at 
bilateral level21 as well as unilaterally22 and engages with a number of in-
ternational actors and institutions in this regard.23 Moreover, IHL influ-
ences the development and the implementation of the Union’s Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Even though, as observed by 
Naert, CSDP operations are unlikely to occur in situations that consti-
tute an armed conflict and, as a consequence, IHL rules are unlikely to 
apply to EU forces, IHL rules may nonetheless be relevant for the par-
ties involved in a crisis in which a CSDP mission operates.24 The proac-
tive role that the EU has carved for itself in the promotion of IHL, 
however, is not detached from any provision of primary law and, as 
20 See A Garrido-Muñoz, ‘La Constitutionalisation du ius in bello dans le droit de 
l’Union Européenne: vers l’“humanitarisation” progressive de l’action extérieure?’ 
Revue Suisse de Droit International et Européen (forthcoming); A-S Millet-Devalle 
(ed), L’Union Européenne et le droit international humanitaire (Pedone 2010) 302. 
21 See for instance IHL–related clauses in a number of recent agreements. For 
Association Agreements see art 12 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement: ‘(…) 2. 
The Parties agree that the fight against terrorism must be conducted with full respect 
for the rule of law and in full conformity with international law including international 
human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and all relevant international counter-
terrorism related instruments’ OJ 30 August 2014 L261/4 and, in relation to 
Partnership And Cooperation Agreements, see art 86 (2) (c) of the EU – Iraq 
Agreement whereby the Parties agree to cooperate on the promotion of human rights 
and IHL. 
22 See, for example, the 2009 Updated European Union Guidelines on promoting 
compliance with international humanitarian law, OJ 15 December 2009 C 303/12, the 
2012 EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy of 25 June 2012. 
(<www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf>) 
and the statements of the spokespersons of the High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission 
and of the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and 
Crisis Response on the on the killing of civilians in the Central African Republic of the 
28 April 2014. <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-324_en.htm>.  
23 See the volume edited by Millet-Devalle (n 20) for a detailed analysis of the 
different ways in which the EU interacts with international organisations, NGOs and 
institutions on IHL issues. 
24 F Naert, ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law in CSDP Operations’ in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti and RA Wessel (n 2) 198. 
 
 
The common European asylum system at a crossroad in Diakité                                       9 
 
Garrido-Muñoz suggests, IHL is being constitutionalised within the EU 
legal order.25 Indeed, there are a number of primary law provisions that 
can be interpreted not only to legitimise the initiatives of the EU in the 
field of IHL, but also to argue in favour of the existence of a constitu-
tional obligation of the EU to respect IHL rules.26 The constitutional tie 
between IHL and the EU legal order can be inferred from Articles 3(5) 
and 21 TEU, which require that the EU must ‘respect the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law’. Far from being a 
rhetorical exercise, the provisions mentioned above have a normative 
function and impose, so far as possible, the consistent interpretation of 
EU secondary norms to international law including, naturally, rules of 
customary law.27 The constitutional significance of this interpretation of 
Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU resides in the fact that, as noted by AG Men-
gozzi in his Opinion in the Diakité case, the application of the principle 
of consistent interpretation does not depend on the express provision of 
an act of the institution in that sense, but stems from the constitutional 
position that the Treaties attribute to international law in the hierarchy 
of the sources within the EU legal order.28 As a consequence, because 
the ICJ has recognised the corpus iuris of the four conventions as ‘in-
transgressible principles of international customary law’29, the EU is 
bound to respect those instruments independently from the fact that 
the EU is not party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As a result of 
this, it is clear that the EU, as well as national authorities applying EU 
norms have an obligation, under EU law to respect IHL and interpret, 
so far as possible, EU legislation in conformity with the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. 
Lastly, the constitutional relevance of IHL also emerges in relation 
to the protection of the right to life under Article 2 EUCFR, Article 2 
ECHR and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR). Again, without entering into the thorny issue con-
25 Garrido-Muñoz (n 20). 
26 ibid. 
27 See Poulsen and Diva Navigation (n 3). 
28 See Opinion of Ag Mengozzi in Diakité (n 5), delivered on 18 July 2013, para 23. 
29 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ 
Rep 226 para 79. 
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cerning the relationship between IHL and human rights,30 suffice it to 
say that from an EU perspective, the right to life and other non-
derogable fundamental rights, as recognised to be applicable also dur-
ing an armed conflict by international or regional courts, will inevitably 
impact the EU, either under its activities under the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) or by virtue of the obligation to respect in-
ternational law and the ECHR.31 Moreover, and as argued by Naert, 
specific obligations pertaining to the protection of human rights during 
an armed conflict may derive, autonomously, through EU human rights 
law and with the consequence that these rules would also affect Mem-
ber States when they execute CSDP operations.32 
The constitutional relevance that IHL and the Geneva Convention 
of 1951 have in the EU legal order as sketched out above reveals a legal 
system open to the influence of international sources and respectful of 
international obligations.  However, taking into consideration the fact 
that IHL and the Geneva Convention of 1951 have an equal standing 
within the hierarchy of norms of the EU, the question concerning the 
relationship and the effects of these two international sources within the 
EU legal order remains open. In other words, the ways in which these 
two sources affect EU legislation and its application remains to be as-
sessed, especially in relation to the application of the Common Europe-
an Asylum System. The next section will analyse the Diakité case in 
which the CJEU was seemingly asked to rule, inter alia, on the relation-
ship between IHL and the application of the Qualification Directive, a 
central instrument of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 See, among others, N Ronzitti, Diritto internazionale dei conflitti armati 
(Giappicchelli 2011) 159-163. 
31 In relation to the right to life see the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 29) para 25. 
32 Naert (n 24) 208-209. 
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3. On the relevance of IHL for the interpretation and application of 
the Qualification Directive in the Diakité case 
 
The EU’s Qualification Directive establishes (minimum)33 standards 
for the qualification and status of third country nationals as refugees or 
as persons who otherwise need international protection and establishes 
two mechanisms of protection. While the first is firmly anchored to the 
Geneva Convention of 1951, the second is specific to EU law and con-
stitutes a subsidiary means of protection established for third country 
nationals that do not qualify as a refugee, but in respect of whom there 
are substantial grounds for believing that such persons would face a real 
risk of suffering serious harm if returned to their country of origin.34 Mr 
Diakité, a Guinean national who took part in the protest movements 
against the ruling regime in his country, applied for asylum in Belgium 
at the beginning of 2008.35 As his applications were rejected by Belgian 
authorities, Mr Diakité filed a last appeal for cassation before the Bel-
gian Conseil d’Etat, in so far as the appealed decisions ‘relied on the def-
inition of “armed conflict” used by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]’ to assess his request for protection 
under national and EU law.36  
Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive provides a specific no-
tion of ‘serious harm’ for the purposes of subsidiary protection under 
Article 2 (e) of the Qualification Directive.37 In order to qualify for sub-
sidiary protection a third country national needs to demonstrate sub-
stantial grounds for believing he or she would face a real risk of suffer-
ing serious harm if returned to his or her country of origin38 and, more 
specifically, that he or she would face a serious harm consisting of: (a) 
the death penalty or execution, (b) torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, or (c) serious and individual threat to a civil-
33 The 2004 Directive was expressly titled as establishing minimum standards for 
the qualification of refugees and persons entitled to international protection, the 2011 
recast of the Directive has repealed such qualitative threshold. 
34 Art 2 (e) of the Qualification Directive of 2004, now art 2 (f) in the 2011 recast 
(n 6). 
35 Diakité (n 5) para 9.  
36 ibid para 14. 
37 Art 2 (e) of the 2004 Qualification Directive (n 6). 
38 ibid. 
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ian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict.39 
In order to ascertain whether Mr Diakité could be granted subsidi-
ary protection, the Belgian referring court asked the CJEU how subpar-
agraph (c) of Article 15 of the Qualification Directive was to be inter-
preted. As paragraph 16 of the judgment reveals, the Belgian Conseil 
d’Etat expressly asked the CJEU to ascertain whether ‘Article 15(c) of 
[Directive 2004/83] [must] be interpreted as meaning that that provi-
sion offers protection only in a situation of “internal armed conflict”, as 
interpreted by international humanitarian law, and, in particular, by 
reference to Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions’ 40 or 
whether the notion of ‘internal armed conflict’ ex Article 15 (c) of the 
Qualification Directive had to be interpreted independently form the 
IHL definition. 
The notion of armed conflict has a pivotal role in IHL insofar as, as 
Bauloz recently argued, not only do ‘armed conflicts form the contextu-
al background of this branch of international law, but more fundamen-
tally armed conflicts trigger its application’.41 In the seminal decision on 
the Tadić case,42 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruled that ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there 
is resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence be-
tween governmental authorities and organised armed groups or be-
tween such groups within a state’.43 Consequently, to speak of an armed 
conflict not of an international character it is necessary that the conflict 
reaches a certain intensity and that the armed groups involved display a 
minimum of organisation. 44 Article 1 (2) of the Additional Protocol II 
of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions specifies further that ‘situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’ cannot be considered 
as armed conflicts (not of an international nature). In the case of Mr Di-
39 Art 15 of the Qualification Directive (n 6). 
40 Diakité (n 5) para 16. 
41 C Bauloz, ‘The Definition of Armed Conflict in Asylum Law’ (2014) 12 J Intl 
Criminal J 836. 
42 Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1-A (Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995) para 70. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. The ICTY speaks of ‘protracted and large-scale violence’. 
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akité it was precisely the latter threshold that was key for the assessment 
of his claim for subsidiary protection. Indeed, because the turmoil char-
acterising the last years of the presidency of Lansana Conté and the vio-
lence emerging after the coup d’Etat of Captian Moussa Dadis Camara 
in December of 2008 never reached the threshold required by the no-
tion of armed conflict emerging from the Tadic decision, the context 
upon which Mr Diakité was applying for protection resembled a case of 
internal disturbances.  
With its decision of the 30 January 2014 the CJEU held that the 
IHL definition of armed conflict was not designed to identify situations 
in which subsidiary protection ex Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Di-
rective has to be granted and thus disconnected the application of the 
Qualification Directive from the notion of ‘armed conflict not of an in-
ternational character’ used in IHL. The Court of Justice based its rea-
soning on two main points. Firstly the CJEU considered that the EU 
legislature used in Article 15 (c) the phrase ‘international or internal 
armed conflict’ as opposed to the existing distinction made by IHL be-
tween ‘international armed conflict and armed conflict not of an inter-
national character’. On the basis of this distinction the CJEU concluded 
that the ‘EU legislature wished to grant subsidiary protection not only 
to persons affected by “international armed conflicts” and by “armed 
conflict not of an international character”, as defined in international 
humanitarian law, but also to persons affected by internal armed con-
flict, provided that such conflict involves indiscriminate violence’.45 
However, this semantic rationale is not very convincing. Indeed, na-
tional courts of EU Member States and scholars have used other ex-
pressions of Article 15 (c) to argue the opposite, i.e. the relevance of 
IHL for the interpretation and application of Article 15 (c) by virtue of 
the fact that the EU provision mirrors some of the IHL terminology.46 
Moreover, the semantic distinction established by the CJEU appears 
even less convincing if one takes into consideration that in the Tadic de-
cision, the ICTY uses the expression ‘international or internal armed 
conflict’ and not the formula ‘armed conflict not of an international 
character’ codified in the Geneva system.47 
45 Diakité (n 5) para 21. 
46 See Bauloz (n 41) 841. 
47 In the second indent of paragraph 70 of the Tadic decision the Tribunal affirms: 
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With its second point the CJEU developed a more convincing ar-
gument. The CJEU argued, similarly to Advocate General Mengozzi, 
that Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive should not be inter-
preted on the basis of IHL because the two notions ‘pursue different 
aims and establish quite distinct protection mechanisms’.48 Two aspects 
of this argumentation can be further analysed, as emerges from the fol-
lowing paragraph: 
 
‘While international humanitarian law is designed, inter alia, to pro-
vide protection for civilian populations in a conflict zone by restricting 
the effects of war on persons and property, it does not – by contrast 
with Article 2(e) of Directive 2004/83, read in conjunction with Article 
15(c) of that directive – provide for international protection to be 
granted to certain civilians who are outside both the conflict zone and 
the territory of the conflicting parties. As a consequence, the defini-
tions of ‘armed conflict’ provided in international humanitarian law 
are not designed to identify situations in which such international pro-
tection would be necessary and would thus have to be granted by the 
competent authorities of the Member States.’49 
 
In this paragraph the CJEU appears to develop and strengthen its 
distinction based on the different objectives of the IHL definition of 
‘armed conflict not of an international character’ and the definition of 
‘internal armed conflict’ under Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Di-
rective. First, the CJEU operates its distinction ratione materiae: affirm-
ing that the disconnection between the notion applicable in IHL and 
the one applicable for the purpose of Article 15 (c) resides in the fact 
that the IHL definition governs the conduct of belligerents during an 
armed conflict with a view, inter alia, to protecting civilians and restrict-
ing the effects of war. The second distinction introduced by the CJEU 
is, on the other hand, ratione territorii: the CJEU affirms that whilst 
IHL regulates the conduct of national authorities and belligerent 
groups that are present in the territory where the armed conflict takes 
place with a view, inter alia, to protecting civilians residing within the 
conflict areas and other territories controlled by the parties to the con-
‘These hostilities exceed the intensity requirements applicable to both international and 
internal armed conflicts’. 
48 Diakité (n 5) para 24. 
49 ibid para 23. 
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flict, the Qualification Directive seeks to provide assistance and protec-
tion to those individuals who are outside ‘both the conflict zone and the 
territory of the conflicting parties’. 
On the basis of the aforementioned arguments the CJEU finally 
concluded that it was not possible, without disregarding the different 
objectives of IHL and the Qualification Directive, to ‘make eligibility 
for subsidiary protection conditional upon a finding that the conditions 
for applying international humanitarian law have been met’50 and put 
forward the definition of internal armed conflict for the purpose of ap-
plying Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive, affirming that ‘“in-
ternal armed conflict” is a situation in which a State’s armed forces con-
front one or more armed groups or in which two or more armed groups 
confront each other’.51 The next section will analyse the extent to which 
the disconnection established by the CJEU served the purpose of en-
hancing the scope of application of Article 15 (c) of the Qualification 
Directive and will also assess the extent to which this decision could be 
interpreted as another claim of autonomy by the CJEU. 
 
 
4.  More than a parochial attitude: extending protection beyond the in-
ternational legal framework 
 
The judgment of the CJEU in Diakité innovatively widens the scope 
of the application of Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive in two 
ways. In relation to the first aspect, the CJEU has signalled to all na-
tional authorities called upon to apply the Qualification Directive, that 
the reference to internal armed conflicts contained therein must be dis-
connected from the notion applicable according to IHL and provided 
an autonomous definition of internal armed conflict to be applied for 
the purpose of granting subsidiary protection to third country nationals. 
In the previous section it was argued that the semantic rationale used by 
the CJEU to depart from the notion of internal armed conflict was not 
convincing and, conversely, the arguments of the CJEU appeared more 
convincing when it anchored its reasoning to the different purposes of 
the two regimes in question.  
50 ibid para 26. 
51 ibid para 28. 
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Looking into the definition provided by the CJEU, it could be ar-
gued that it borders on the obvious, since it does not provide parame-
ters concerning the intensity or the duration of a given confrontation in 
order to qualify it as an internal conflict.52 Yet, as Carlier has recently 
observed, it is precisely in this simplicity that the importance of the de-
cision resides.53 Indeed, with its definition, the CJEU has stripped down 
the notion of internal armed conflict to its minimum, so as to exclude 
the necessity of having to assess the intensity of such confrontations, the 
level of organisation of the armed forces involved and whether the con-
flict has lasted for a specific length of time.54 Conversely, the CJEU af-
firms that for the purpose of applying Article 15 (c) of the Qualification 
Directive the central element is constituted by another threshold con-
tained therein: the notion of ‘indiscriminate violence’. In this regard, 
and building upon its previous decision in the Elgafaji case,55 the CJEU 
held that the protection mechanism of Article 15 (c) is triggered when-
ever the degree of indiscriminate violence of an internal armed conflict 
‘reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believ-
ing that a civilian, if returned to the relevant country or, as the case may 
be, to the relevant region, would – solely on account of his presence in 
the territory of that country or region – face a real risk of being subject 
to that threat’.56 However, it remains to be seen how the CJEU and na-
tional courts will interpret, from a substantive perspective, the seeming-
ly oxymoronic relationship between ‘serious and individual threat’ on 
the one side and a situation of ‘indiscriminate violence’ on the other. To 
date, the CJEU has shied away from clarifying this crucial aspect for the 
application of the subsidiary protection mechanism, with the result that 
52 The CJEU defined an internal armed conflict as ‘a situation in which a State’s 
armed forces confront one or more armed groups or in which two or more armed 
groups confront each other’ para 28.  
53 J-Y Carlier, ‘Guerre et paix pour les demandeurs d’asile. A propos de l’arrêt 
Diakité de la Cour de Justice’  (2014) Journal des Tribunaux 237-239. The author 
argues that: ‘Si la définition paraît simple et évidente, c’est bien par son ombre qu’elle 
importe. Il faut y lire en creux les critères que la Cour n’impose pas pour qu’il y ait 
conflit armé interne, critères qu’elle exclut même expressément dans la suite de l’arrêt 
et dans son dispositif’(at 238). 
54 Diakité (n 5) paras 32 and 34. 
55 Case C-465/07 M. Elgafaji, N. Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-
00921. 
56 Diakité (n 5) para 30.  
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national authorities called to apply Article 15 (c) of the Qualification 
Directive have no guidance from the CJEU. 
 Paragraph 31 of the Diakité judgment, considers the relationship 
between individual threat and indiscriminate violence in the following 
manner: ‘the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically 
affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, 
the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eli-
gible for subsidiary protection’.57 The variable dynamic described by the 
CJEU, however, remains undefined since the CJEU does not provide 
the criteria to determine the level of indiscriminate violence nor the lev-
el to which a person seeking protection must be impacted in order to be 
recognised as a person in need of subsidiary protection.58 As a result of 
this decision, the application of Article 15 (c) remains an equation with 
variables on both sides, for which the CJEU does not provide the con-
crete criteria to solve the jigsaw. And even though it could be inferred 
that when Article 15 (c) mentions a ‘civilian’s life or person’, it intends 
to refer to fundamental rights, such as those protected by the EUCFR, 
the types of rights covered by this provision and the level of threat to 
their enjoyment remain questions to be defined. It is on the other hand 
evident that the solution to these crucial issues cannot be left to the dis-
persed application of national jurisdictions without posing problems of 
consistency and legitimacy within the CEAS.59 
With the intention of maximising the scope of subsidiary protec-
tion, the disconnection established by the CJEU between Article 15 (c) 
of the Qualification Directive and IHL has been welcomed by scholars 
57 ibid para 31. 
58 For a critical analysis of these substantive aspects see See V Moreno-Lax (n 4) 
and J -F Durieux, ‘Of War, Flows and Flaws: A reply to Hugo Storey’ (2012) 31 
Refugee Survey Q 161–176. 
59 For an analysis of the different approaches emerged within two EU Member 
States see see H Lambert and T Farrel, ‘The Changing Character of Armed Conflict and 
the Implications For Refugee Protection Jurisprudence’ (2010) 22 Intl J Refugee L 237. 
Already the 2007 UNHCR report showed that art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive 
was being interpreted and applied divergently within the EU, also in relation to 
applicants coming from the same region. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Asylum in the European Union. A Study of the Implementation of the 
Qualification Directive (November 2007) 76 available at <www.refworld.org/ 
docid/473050632.html>. 
 
 
18 QIL 12 (2015), 3-20          ZOOM IN 
concerned with EU asylum law.60 In this respect the Diakité decision 
contributes to the achievement of a higher level of approximation of the 
rules on the recognition and content of international protection on the 
one side,61 and harmonises a key notion for the purpose of applying Ar-
ticle 15 (c) amongst the Member States of the European Union on the 
other. Yet, one might wonder whether these two results could also have 
been achieved without operating such a disconnection. Whilst there is 
no doubt that the different purposes of IHL and the Qualification Di-
rective were analysed and convincingly used as an argument to operate 
the said disconnection, 62 the CJEU could have alternatively acknowl-
edged the existing IHL rules and decisions of international tribunals on 
the definition of internal armed conflict as an ‘indicative framework’ 
from which the specific rules on the application of the Qualification Di-
rective could be derived. However, by doing so the CJEU would have 
entered troubled waters and could have jeopardised the uniform appli-
cation of the Qualification Directive internally, since with this solution, 
national authorities would have been empowered to condition the ap-
plication of EU law on the basis of their interpretation of the different 
IHL rules; therefore, this solution would likely have blurred the rela-
tionship between IHL rules and the Qualification Directive in the long 
run. Finally, another possibility would have been to consider, for the 
purpose of defining when and where an internal armed conflict occurs, 
and at least as a reference, the determinations ex Article 39 of the UN 
Charter made by the UN Security Council. Since the latter case covers 
also and inter alia, internal armed conflicts the CJEU could have used 
this bridge to uphold its commitments towards the international com-
munity and the UN ex Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU. However, and again, 
using this path would also have posed greater challenges to the CJEU. 
Indeed, because of the level of discretion retained by the Security 
Council on the matter, choosing such a path would have been to the 
detriment of the effective and uniform application of EU law on the one 
hand, and the effective protection of individuals on the other. Possibly, 
then, by operating the disconnect between the Qualification Directive 
60 See C Bauloz (n 41), J-Y Carlier (n 53) and J Larik, ‘Protection from internal 
armed conflict in EU law: the Diakité case’ in European Law Blog, 12 February 2014 
<http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2191>. 
61 See recital (10) of the 2011 recast of the Qualification Directive (n 6). 
62 Especially in the detailed Opinion of AG Mengozzi (n 28), paras 17-80. 
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and IHL the CJEU has opted for the simplest and most effective way to 
attain the objectives of the EU whilst avoiding any substantive future 
tension between the EU legal order and the international one in relation 
to the definition of ‘internal armed conflict’. In this sense, the decision 
of the CJEU to disconnect the Qualification Directive from IHL is to be 
welcomed for having preserved the proper functions of the two branch-
es of law in question from undue influences rather than as a manifesta-
tion of the autonomy of the EU legal order against external influences.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion: the ambiguous results of disconnecting the Qualification 
Directive from IHL 
 
This contribution took its cue from the growing scholarly attention 
given to the relationship between the EU legal order and the interna-
tional one and sought to analyse the extent to which the Diakité deci-
sion could be interpreted as another parochial decision of the CJEU to 
the detriment of the principle of respect of international law as estab-
lished by the EU Treaties. While it was argued that the EU legal order 
is open, in principle, to the influence of the Geneva Convention of 1951 
and IHL, it was also argued that the Diakité case was less connected to 
these two external sources than what could be inferred prima facie. As a 
result of this, the disconnection established by the CJEU was convinc-
ingly anchored to the specific objective of helping national authorities 
in the application of Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive, and 
the Court chose to set aside the question on the relationship between 
IHL and subsidiary protection, in order to maximise the scope of pro-
tection offered by the Directive. Moreover, the decision of the CJEU 
should bring to an end the existing discrepancies on the application of 
Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive by the national authorities 
of the EU Member States.63 
However, it also emerged that the decision of the CJEU in Diakité 
and the disconnection established between IHL and EU asylum law 
leaves a number of questions unanswered. Firstly, in relation to the dis-
connection itself, the CJEU has not clarified what the autonomous no-
tion of internal armed conflict entails for the purpose of applying Arti-
63 See (n 59). 
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cle 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. Secondly, the CJEU also missed 
an opportunity to clarify the relationship between the notion of indis-
criminate violence and the level to which a person seeking subsidiary 
protection within the EU, must prove that they are affected by it. Tak-
ing these two factors into account, one could argue that the CJEU actu-
ally lifted the only substantive, and relatively clear, point of reference 
that national authorities had to apply Article 15 (c) of the Qualification 
Directive, i.e. the notion of internal armed conflict as developed within 
the context of IHL. Indeed, whilst the disconnection offered the CJEU 
the opportunity to develop a holistic and EU-centred approach for the 
interpretation and application of Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Di-
rective, the CJEU has actually failed to seize this opportunity. Instead, 
interpreters and practitioners of EU asylum law are left without any 
clear indication on the substantive conditions upon which Article 15 (c) 
can be applied.  
In conclusion, the outcome of the Diakité decision raises mixed feel-
ings. Far from being a parochial decision regarding the relationship be-
tween the EU legal order and the international one, Diakité emerges as 
an incautious one. Taking into consideration the existing gaps within 
the Common European Asylum System on the one hand, and the con-
stitutional relevance that IHL, the Geneva Convention of 1951 and re-
gional instruments on human rights protection have on the EU legal 
system on the other, European Union asylum law will undoubtedly 
need to integrate external norms to enhance its legitimacy in the future; 
from this point of view, Diakité stands out as a missed opportunity.  
 
 
 
 
